1. Maintaining Syria's influence in Lebanon;
2. Syria's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict;
3. Maintaing Syria's role in the regional balance;
4. And maintaing a relationship with the United States.
   

This essay aims to analyse Syria's current position in relation to these four major components. It is important to realise firstly that Syria's relationship with Lebanon has created a dark cloud that that plagues Syria's overall objectives. When Bashar Al-Assad came to power in July 2000, Syria's role in world affairs was much stronger than it was after February 14, 2005.

Lebanon was an important asset to Syria. When President Hafez Al-Assad sent Syrian troops there in 1976, it was to stop Israel from establishing hegemony over Lebanon. He figured that if he could control Lebanese affairs, it would give him better bargaining power when dealing with the Israelis. Also, Lebanon could no longer be used a base for Syrian opposition. That is why it was essential to hold on to Lebanon from Syria's point of view.

Now that Syrian troops have left Lebanon and a new anti-Syrian Parliament has taken office, what options does President Bashar Al-Assad have in trying to play a role in Lebanese affairs? Well, for starters, he can close the Syrian-Lebanese border to Lebanese trade; that has already happened. Al-Assad asked Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to make sure Lebanon doesn't become an anti-Syrian base and he as agreed to that. Also, Syria can still maintain some influence over Hizbullah. All in all, despite Syria'a withdrawal from Lebanon, it still has the potential to play a role, although smaller, in Beirut's affairs.

With regards to the Arab-Israeli arena, Syria has been weakened after its retreat from Lebanon. Nevertheless, Syria's use of anti-Israeli groups is still a way to get Washington and Tel Aviv's attention. It is still a reminder that Syria has the ability to confront its enemies without having to resort to official military action. With regards to Hizbullah, any influence Syria now wields over it can be better used than when Syria occupied Lebanon. Back then, when Hizbullah carried out an attack, Syria was blamed. Today, it is harder to blame Syria because there is no more official evidence that Syria assists Hizbullah. Al-Assad's use of these groups is simply to get Israel to the negotiating table on terms favourable to Syria. However, with Ariel Sharon in power, it is quite a risk.

Diplomatic marginalisation for Syria is a nightmare. Syria knows that in order play a big role in the regional balance in the Middle East, it had to find a way to get Washington to hear its message. It continues to have two ways of doing so: through Washington's allies and states hostile to it.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, close allies of the USA, help Syria by carrying its message to the Bush Administration. Under international pressure to withdraw his troops from Lebanon, President Al-Assad sought the help of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. When the Prince told Al-Assad that Syrian-Saudi relations could be harmed if Syria refused to withdraw, Al-Assad pushed forward with the withdrawal. During the funeral of King Fahd in August 2005, President Al-Assad could be seen standing a couple meters away from the side of the new King Abdullah, a sign that Syrian-Saudi relations remain close. However, due to Rafik Al-Hariri's closeness to the Saudi royals, relations could be jeopardised between the two countries if the Mehlis report points the finger of blame on Syria.

Following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Syria suspended diplomatic relations with Egypt for ten years from 1979 to 1989. It was a wise decision to resume them in 1989 because during that time, Syria's Gulf allies were angered by Al-Assad's support for Iran during its eight-year war with Iraq. Without the Saudis to get their message across, Syria decided to heal her wounds with Egypt. Following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, President Al-Assad held discussions with Egyptian President Housni Mubarak in an effort to ease internation pressure on Syria. However, Mubarak is an old man. It is rather to doubtful to even think that his son may succeed him. Whoever does succeed him may not favour such close ties to Syria, especially if that new government despises what it believes to be undemocratic states.

Since supporting Iran against Iraq, both Syria and Iran have had close relations. Leverett argues that one of its aims in allying herself with such problematic states was to convey the message to Washington that there were risks involved if Syria was ignored. Damascus and Tehran's support for Hizbullah is testament to that. It should also be noted that in the aftermath of Al-Hariri's assassination, Syria was under tremendous international pressure. For its part, Washington recalled its ambassador to Damascus for consultations the day after. Damascus' response was to send Prime Minister Naji Al-Otri to meet Iranian ministers the day of Al-Hariri's funeral. The end result was a pledge by both states to form a united front to deal with Washington's threats.

Six years prior to the invasion of Iraq, Syria began opening bilateral ties with its former enemies in Baghdad. By 1997, Saddam Hussein, feeling the burden of isolation, decided it was in his best interests to engage Damascus. When Bashar took over, better relations began to develop between the former rivals. In fact, President Al-Assad sent the then-Prime Minister Mustafa Miro to Baghdad to meet President Saddam Hussein. An oil pipeline was opened between Kirkuk and the port of Banyas. This relationship with Baghdad was an even bigger message to Washington and Tel Aviv than its relation with Iran was. However, with Saddam's downfall and a pro-American government in charge, Iraq now has the potential to join Egypt and Saudi Arabia as Syria's messengers to Washington. However, this has been hampered as Iraq accuses Syria of not doing enough to protect its borders against insurgents entering Iraq.

It should also be noted that Turkey remains one of Syria's few allies in the region currently. It is important to bear in mind that the Turkish President ignored American pressure to abandon his official visit to Damascus earlier this year. US-Turkish relations have been at a low ever since Turkey refused to support the USA's Iraq war, and this has turned out to be good news for the Al-Assad regime. Despite the fact that Syria and Turkey were on the brink of war in the late 1990s, it has been the issue of Kurdish separatism that keeps them in a alliance. Since US-Turkish relations began to pick up earlier this year, Syria may now be able to look at Turkey as another of her messengers to Washington.

Currently, Syria's relationship with the USA is at a low. They could even be worse now than they were back in the 1980s when Syria and militias allied to it attacked American positions in Lebanon. Also, Washington withdrew its ambassador to Damascus back in 1987 as well when Syria was implicated in the Hindawi affair. Syria's relationship with the USA recovered from those events, but it was different back then. It those days, there was no 9-11 that could be used as a means to justify regime change in Damascus due to Washington's designation of Syria as being a state-sponsor of terrorism. Also back then, Washington didn't engage Al-Assad's Syrian opposition parties. However, this could all be ploy to get Syria to change her behaviour. There were rumors that when Secretary Rice visited Emille Lahoud in Beirut, a secret agreement was reached with Damascus. She couldn't make a visit to Damascus for political reasons, but it has been rumored that there was more to her meeting with the pro-Syrian President. As of now, there is a possibility that US-Syrian relations can recover, but only time will tell.

Leverett gives a clear understanding of how Syrian politics works in his book. It becomes easier to understand Syria's actions with regards to her neighbours. Despite the fact that Syria remains a mystery to many, Dennis Ross states that "Leverett's book begins to unravel the mystery". After reading it, one could even start to predict Syria's next moves. It has become clear that what Syria aims to do is not to give in easily to pressure. The Al-Assad regime wants to use every possible moment to avoid changing its behaviour in order to portray the message that Syria doesn't succumb to outsides pressure easily, and that engaging her on a dimplomatic level is the only way to deal with her. That is just one of the conclusions I drew from this book.